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French Wines on the Decline? Econometric 
Evidence from Britain 
 
Bodo Steiner1 
 
 
 
French wines, differentiated by geographic origin, served for many decades as a basis for 
the French success in the British wine market. However in the early 1990s, market share 
began to decline. This article explores the values that market participants placed on 
labelling information on French wines in Britain in 1994. Results from a parametric 
hedonic approach indicate that both the lack of a consistently positive valuation of varietal 
wines and the low valuation of wines with geographical appellation help to explain the 
overall decline of France’s role in the British wine market.  
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the large array of geographical labels and a stringent approach to labelling, 
French wines with geographical appellation were, for many decades, successfully 
marketed in Britain and other markets. Since 1992, however, France's overall 
market share in the British wine market has declined, and it has become 
questionable whether French wines based on geographic appellation have been able 
to meet the expectations of the current generation of wine consumers in Britain. In 
response to the decline, French producers have adopted new labelling approaches 
for a limited number of regional wines and a number of questions arise in this 
context. First, has the French expansion of, and emphasis on, varietal wines during 
the early 1990s been able to mitigate the overall decline of French wine in the 
British wine market?
2
 Second, how did consumers value these new varietal wines 
relative to the traditionally labelled AOC wines (as epitomised, for example, by the 
wines from the Bordeaux region)?
3
  
 
This article analyses the values that market participants place on the labelling 
information provided by French wine labels of still light wine in the British off-
licence sector.
4
 The British wine and off-licence market is of particular interest for 
                                                          
1  Bodo Steiner is Assistant Professor at the University of Alberta, Department of Rural Economy, 515 
General Services Building, Edmonton, AB T6G 2H1 Canada. E-mail: bsteiner@ualberta.ca for 
correspondence. This work was sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation. The author would like to 
thank Pierre Spahni, two anonymous referees and the editor for valuable comments. 
2 „Varietal‟ refers to the descriptive term for a wine named after the dominant grape variety from 
which it is made. Any wine produced in the European Union (EU) that mentions a grape variety on 
the label must contain at least 85% of that variety. 
3 AOC denotes „Appelation d'Origine Contrôlée‟ and stands for the highest wine classification a 
French wine can attain. Though the requirements may vary from one region to another, they are 
very tightly defined, particularly in terms of grape varieties and maximum yield per hectare 
permitted. 
4 As explored below, the off-licence sector is characterised by the fact that wine is consumed outside 
the premises in which it was purchased (e.g. retail outlet). Still light wine is defined as the product 
obtained exclusively from the total or partial alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes or fresh musts, 
with a total alcoholic strength usually not exceeding 15% volume. 
at least three reasons. First, Great Britain has become renowned for its expertise in 
selecting, importing, bottling and cellaring wine. The prosperous wine trade of 
French wine from Bordeaux began in 1152, and prior to the re-unification of 
Germany, the UK was the world's largest wine importer in terms of value (1990: 
£993.3 million, Spahni, 2000). UK imports of still light wine were responsible for 
34% of the total wine imports of the EU in 1993 (by value). Second, since Britain 
has never produced much wine of its own, consumers have traditionally been 
exposed to a large variety of wines from many origins.
5
 Third, the emergence of 
supermarkets as the most crucial retailing channel for wine has resulted in 
intensified competition among distributors and the restructuring of many specialist 
shops (Spahni, 2000, p.187). Using observed consumer choices of heterogeneous 
bundles of labelling attributes for wine, this paper employs hedonic price analysis to 
explore the implicit valuation that market participants place on labelling attributes.
6
 
 
Several recent studies on wine have applied hedonic price analyses, among them 
Golan and Shalit (1993), Oczkowski (1994), Nerlove (1995) and Combris et al. 
(1997). In Golan and Shalit's (1993) study on hedonic grape and wine pricing, the 
authors aim to identify and evaluate the wine quality characteristics of Israeli 
grapes. By estimating the relative contribution of grape characteristics to wine 
quality, and using the monetary values from the Californian market, the authors are 
able to provide a producer pricing schedule for Israel. This quality-based pricing 
schedule is derived to reduce the production of poor-quality wines, by giving Israeli 
farmers an appropriate incentive to supply higher quality grapes. 
 
Based on recommended retail prices for Australian premium table wine, Oczkowski 
(1994) identifies the implicit valuation of wine attributes for consumers and 
retailers. On the producer side, the author suggests that the hedonic functions 
estimated provide important information upon which longer-term investment 
decisions may be made. Oczkowski (1994) includes dummy variables for producer 
size in the hedonic regression and argues that this allows for two effects. First, for 
possible pricing strategies and second, as measuring the characteristic of 
„exclusiveness‟. That is, some consumers desire particular wines from small 
producers because of their limited availability, rarity and „trendiness‟. The author's 
innovative approach to the underlying dummy variable model permits explicit 
estimation of coefficients for all dummy variables. 
 
In contrast to previous hedonic analyses, Nerlove (1995) assumes that variety prices 
are exogeneously determined and consumer preferences are expressed by the 
quantities of each variety they buy. His assumption that the state-owned Swedish 
retail monopoly does not exercise any monopsony power leads him to take variety 
supplies as perfectly elastic for the group of consumers being considered. 
Therefore, the quantities of each variety consumed are regressed on the variety‟s 
                                                          
5 The percentage volume shares of both British and English still light wine sales were below 3% in 
1992 (CFCE, 1994). Wine grown and made in England is called English wine, whereas wine made 
in Britain from imported concentrate is called „British wine‟ or „British made wine‟. 
6 The fact that hedonic analysis has been applied to a large field of quality-related issues is largely due 
to the work of Zvi Griliches and Sherwin Rosen (inter alia Griliches, 1961 and 1971;Rosen, 1974). 
Using the generalised commodity approach to demand analysis, Houthakker (1952) was first to 
present the hedonic function as a market phenomenon. 
price and on the quality attributes which characterise that variety. Estimates of the 
implicit valuations of quality attributes are shown to differ greatly from those 
obtained from the classical hedonic regression with price as the dependent variable. 
 
Combris et al. (1997) apply a stepwise regression procedure to investigate whether 
quality matters in explaining Bordeaux wine market prices. The authors suggest that 
for their data set, quality, as measured by a jury grade assigned by professional 
wine tasters is mainly explained by the „subjective‟ sensory characteristics of the 
wine, which are unobservable when consumers choose the wine. Implicit price 
estimates are derived from data of a wine tasting panel that is unable to observe any 
of the „objective characteristics‟ (grape variety, vintage year etc.), including price, 
of the wines they judge. Comparing these jury grades with hedonic estimates of 
labelling attributes, the authors conclude that many variables, which are important 
in explaining quality, do not play a role in the determination of market prices. The 
authors explain their findings with taste differences between wine tasters and 
consumers and imperfect information on the wine consumers‟ behalf. 
 
More generally, labelling issues and the degree and value of product attribute 
information have been addressed by several recent papers in the literature. In the 
context of international trade and economic growth, Basu et al. (2003) examine the 
effectiveness of eco-labels in providing a market-based solution to the under-
consumption of eco-friendly products in developing and developed countries. 
Nimon and Beghin (1999) examine the implications of eco-labelling schemes on 
consumer choice sets and product quality in the textile and apparel trade. Mahé 
(1997) and Bureau et al.(1998) investigate the role of information on quality 
attributes and the role of quality labelling in the process of agricultural trade 
liberalisation and calculate the welfare effects from such de-regulation. Marette et 
al. (1999) analyse the impact of certified quality labelling on welfare when common 
labelling schemes matter and asymmetric information is present. Bureau et al. 
(2001) investigate the informational role of quality labelling for trade policy and 
welfare when adverse selection matters due to the presence of food hazard risk. In a 
vertical differentiation model, Ibanez and Stenger (2000) investigate the efficiency 
of labelling, emphasising food safety as a means of reducing negative production 
externalities and raising consumer welfare. By expanding an AIDS model to 
include information effects and demographic characteristics, Teisl and Levy (1997) 
show that nutrient labelling can affect consumer purchase behaviour in significant 
ways. Van der Lans et al. (2001) employ a conjoint analysis to show that Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) labels have no direct effect on consumer preferences 
in the case of olive oil. Bonnet and Simioni (2001) use a mixed logit model of 
demand to recover the distribution of consumers' willingness-to-pay for labelled 
cheese (Camembert), and to demonstrate that consumers do not value the quality 
signal provided by PDO labels for these French cheeses. 
Our analysis contributes to the existing hedonic price literature on wine markets in 
the following ways. First, we expand the dummy variable approach that was 
pioneered by Kennedy (1986) and Oczkowski (1994) to obtain a distinct and 
comparable contribution of each attribute to the variation of prices. The 
econometric approach addresses heteroscedasticity explicitly by using a General 
Least Squares (GLS) estimator. Second, in contrast to Combris et al. (1997) we do 
not rely on sensory characteristics, but use attributes that can be observed by 
consumers through the label (grape variety, vintage year etc.). Third, in contrast to 
previous hedonic studies related to wine, we do not rely on recommended retailer 
prices, but rather on actual retail prices. This has significant implications since 
many wines sold in the off-trade are sold by way of promotional discounts. The 
empirical study uses a survey comprising actual retail prices of 7062 bottles of still 
wine, identified by „objective‟ labelling attributes (region of origin, vintage etc.). 
 
Section 2 provides relevant background information to the British wine market. The 
theoretical framework for describing agents‟ valuation of wine attributes is 
developed in section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces the empirical model specification 
and is followed by a discussion of the data (section 3.3) and the functional form 
(section 3.4). Section 3.5 discusses the data analysis and specification search. 
Finally, section 3.6 provides an empirical assessment of the postulates from the 
above. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The British Wine Market 
The right to sell alcoholic beverages in the UK is linked to two types of licence: the 
„off-licence‟, where the product is consumed outside the premises in which it was 
purchased (e.g. retail outlets), and the „on-licence‟ where alcohol is consumed in 
situ (e.g. pubs, clubs and restaurants).
 7
 The structure of the off-licence trade is such 
that two main commercial categories can be distinguished: those firms who only 
have wines and other alcoholic drinks on offer (the „wine specialists‟) and others, 
for which wine is only part of their product range (the grocery-multiples). Amongst 
the former category, the independent specialists can be distinguished from those 
belonging to breweries or other groups. The grocery-multiples include independent 
food retailers, large general retailers (e.g. Marks and Spencer) and Co-ops. With 
more than 45,000 points of sale and 70% (by value) of total wine sales in 1993, the 
off-licence sector dominates the wine market in the UK. Within the off-licence 
sector, France, Germany, and Italy held traditionally the largest market shares 
(Table 1). 
 
In recent years however, there has been a decline in the popularity of wine from 
these sources. The combined volume share of imported wine from France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain, declined from 89% in 1983 to 78% in 1993 and 71.5% in 
2000 (DWI, 2002). French volume shares of total light wine in the off-licence 
sector alone, declined from 29% in 1992 to 23% in 2000 (CFCE, 2001). 
 
In order to explore the relative performance of French varietal and appellations 
wines in more depth, we first need to consider the French classification system. For 
French wines, the European classification scheme for „quality wines that are 
produced in certain regions‟ (VQPRD) contains both AOC wines and „high-quality 
wine from an approved regional vineyard‟ (VDQS).8 The varietal wines are to be 
found in the non-VQPRD wine category, which consists of table wine („Vins de 
table‟) and country wines („Vins de pays‟). 
                                                          
7 Sales beyond those in the off- and on-licence market can be attributed to catering and sales by mail. 
8
. VQPRD denotes „Vins de Qualité Produits dans des Régions Déterminées‟, whereas VDQS denotes 
„vins délimités de qualité supérieure‟. Compared to the AOC wines, the laws for VDQS are often 
less stringent on yields and grape varieties, yet all VDQS wines have to undergo an official tasting. 
 
 
Table 1: Country Shares of Still Light Wine Sales in the Off-licence and On-licence 
Trades (1992, percentage of volume) 
 
 Off-licence On-licence 
France 28.8 52.2 
Germany 25.8 28.0 
Italy 18.1 10.2 
Spain 5.5 1.6 
Bulgaria 4.5 0.5 
Australia 4.3 1.7 
UK (British & English) 2.7 0.1 
Yugoslavia 2.0 1.7 
Portugal 2.0 0.6 
USA 1.9 0.4 
Hungary 1.5 0.0 
EU blends 0.3 0.5 
Other origins 2.6 2.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 Source: CFCE, 1994 
 
 
This country wine category (which consists of three distinct categories) contains the 
majority of varietal wines.
9
 In the British off-licence trade in 2000, 61% of varietal 
wines were from the „country wine‟ category (CFCE, 2001). To understand how 
these wine categories evolved during the 1990s consider Figures 1 and 2 which 
show total sales of French varietal wines (non-VQPRD from France) and total sales 
of French wines with geographic appelation (French VQPRD wines) in Britain. 
 
Whereas French varietal wines have sustained their sales and have recorded a slow 
but steady growth since 1995 (Figure 1), only a slight upward trend is apparent for 
French wines with geographic appellation (Figure 2). Nevertheless, French wines 
with geographic appellation appear to have performed better than geographic 
appellations from other origins (Figure 2). However, comparing non-VQPRD wines 
from France with non-VQPRD from other origins (Figure 1), it is apparent that 
varietal wines from other countries have been far more successful than varietal 
wines from France. Whereas sales of non-VDPRD wines from other origins more 
than tripled between 1991 and 1998, the growth of French non-VDPRD wines was 
modest over the same period. 
 
 
Figure 1: Sales of Non-VQPRD Wines in Britain 
                                                          
9 The country wine category consists of „Vins de pays de département‟, „Vins de pays de petite zone‟ 
and „Vins de pays de région‟. 
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Figure 2: Sales of VQPRD Wines in Britain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Onivins (2003) 
 
 
Since the country wine category (VdP) is that category in which most varietal wines 
are found, and since most varietal wines which are sold off-licence in the UK 
originate from the region of Languedoc-Roussillon (86% by volume in 2000, 
CFCE, 2001), consider the evolution of production of varietal wines versus AOC 
wines in this region. Figure 3 displays the production of AOC wines, VdP from 
Languedoc-Roussillon, „VdP de petite zone‟ and „VdP de région‟. 
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Figure 3: Production of VdP and AOC Wines from Languedoc-Roussillon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Veille International Vins et Spiritueux (CFCE, various Issues) 
 
 
The most striking change is for wines from the „VdP de région‟, which has shown 
impressive growth since the 1980s.
10
 It is therefore instructive to enquire whether 
these supply-side changes reflect British consumers‟ valuation of varetial wines per 
se or simply those from the Languedoc, and the degree to which this has been at the 
expense of AOC and varietal wines from other French origins. The following 
empirical analysis seeks to shed light on this issue and in so doing, contribute to our 
understanding of the declining importance of French wines in the British wine 
market? 
 
3. Application of the Hedonic Framework to Wine Labelling 
3.1 Theory  
In Rosen's (1974) model of product differentiation, upon which this paper relies, the 
market notion of hedonic prices, as initiated by Houthakker (1952), is developed. 
Hedonic prices are defined as the implicit prices of attributes as they are revealed 
by economic agents from observed prices and the specific amounts of those 
characteristics which are associated with each observed price. What is being 
estimated in Rosen‟s (1974) description of a competitive equilibrium is the locus of 
intersections of the demand curves of different consumers with varying tastes and 
the supply functions of different producers with possibly varying technologies of 
                                                          
10 In order to replace poor quality varietals, more than 200.000 hectares were uprooted in Languedoc-
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production. The implicit estimated prices give us, therefore, the implicit marginal 
valuation that consumers and producers place on labelling attributes. 
 
We consider that wine sold at the retail level can be characterised by n  observed 
labelling attributes, such that a bottle of wine is described by a vector of wine 
attributes 1( ,..., )nx x x  and a corresponding price 1( ) ( ,..., )np x p x x , which is 
defined at each point in the attribute space. Given consumer preferences over m  
other goods, 1,..., mz z , and assuming that the utility function U  is concave with 
respect to wine and other goods, we envisage a consumer that is maximising utility 
over the composite good x  and other goods, subject to a non-linear budget 
constraint.  
 
Further, we assume that agents cannot trade wine attributes directly since attributes 
are bundled within a wine bottle. Due to the bundling of characteristics in terms of 
goods, there may not be enough trading possibilities (say, certain grape varieties 
can only be grown in certain regions). Thus, equilibrium prices may not be linearly 
decomposed in the Lancaster (1966) sense and a mutually advantageous trade in 
goods may not be possible, with the result that marginal utilities may not be 
proportional in equilibrium. Given that attribute packages may not be untied, yet 
perfect divisibility in both product and attribute markets is satisfied, we expect that 
the hedonic price function is convex in equilibrium (Jones, 1988).  
 
Rosen (1974) shows that in the case where only one unit of the good is purchased 
and where production sets of the goods are convex with a non-empty interior, 
marginal analysis can proceed. However, he emphasises that where perfect 
divisibility in production cannot be justified, generalisation has to incorporate non-
convexities and account for discontinuities (p.54). Thus, only when isolated 
locations on the attribute surface are filled, can non-marginal decisions be 
addressed in markets where pure competition is absent. In the case of the British 
wine market, we assume that perfect competition prevails amongst retailers and that 
no discontinuities apply. However, we acknowledge that this will be an 
approximation since production sets of wine attribute bundles may be non-convex 
due to the inability of producers (and retailers) to supply a continuous range of 
attribute combinations to consumers.
11
 
 
3.2 Empirical model specification 
Due to the nature of the data, which are binary (i.e. the attribute is present or not), 
and due to the necessity to retain comparability across attributes, our variables 
undergo a modification that changes the interpretation of the estimates produced. 
As a result of this modification, and after adjusting the coefficient estimates with 
the estimated variances, the correct interpretation is that the coefficients measure 
the relative impact on the dependent variable (the unit price evaluated at the sample 
means) in the presence of the attribute ceteris paribus. 
 
                                                          
11  A strict interpretation of continuity would refer to choice sets, which have infinitely many products 
that span a continuous spectrum in attribute space. 
From theory we expect that non-linear functional forms provide an appropriate 
specification, although the choice of the functional form for the hedonic price 
function should remain an empirical matter. Considering a semilogarithmic (log-lin) 
model, we follow Kennedy (1981) and Goldberger (1968) to obtain a dummy 
variable coefficient estimate g , such that 
 1)ˆ(ˆ
2
1
ˆexp 





 cVcg  (1) 
where ˆ ˆ( )V c  is an estimate of the variance of ˆ( )c , the estimated coefficient of the 
dummy variable. Further, we rely on a procedure for adjusting dummy variable 
coefficient estimates that does not result in the discarding of variables from the 
equation (Suits, 1984). Following Suits (1984), who interprets the estimates as 
deviations from average behaviour, we impose identifying restrictions, but instead 
of employing Kennedy's (1986) laborious extension of Suits (1984), we expand on 
Oczkowski (1994), and substitute the full constraint into the initial equation.
12
 Then, 
following symmetrical estimation, it is possible to obtain all coefficient estimates.  
The following example illustrates the procedure. If, for example, the objective is to 
obtain coefficient estimates for wine colours (red, white, rosé: 1 2 3, ,C C C ) and, say, 
three producer regions ( 1 2 3, ,R R R ), the constraints can be substituted as following: 
 
]/)(/)([
0
1331221
332211
PcPcPcPc
PcPcPc




  (2) 
where Pc  indicates the mean, hence the proportion of non-zeros in the colour 
categories for each bottle of wine. Also, 
 
]Pr/)Pr(Pr/)Pr(Pr/)Pr([
0PrPrPrPr
2442332112
44332211




 (3) 
where, Pr reflects the proportion of non-zeros in the region categories for each 
bottle of wine. This, substituted into the initial equation, gives 
 
44332244233211
1133221133122
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(4) 
and, 
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 (5) 
The corresponding hedonic model assumes therefore, 
 εXXXXXp bbbaa  ][][][][][ 4433113322   (6) 
                                                          
12  Instead of forcing one of the coefficients of the dummy variables to be zero, all of them could be 
restricted to zero and the resulting intercept can be interpreted as the average of the intercepts of all 
observations in the sample. 
where p is a 1N   vector of transformed observations on the price per bottle P , 
there are five 1N   vectors of X observations,   and   define the unknown 
parameters, and ε  is a 1N   vector of unknown stochastic disturbances. A 
symmetrical substitution generates estimates for the remaining coefficients 1  and 
2 . Importantly, this specification would embody an equivalence effect, if we were 
to drop one category to avoid perfect multicollinearity. So, for example, the 
estimated implicit price differences between Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot would 
be assumed to be the same across all regions. To avoid this equivalence effect we 
specify an empirical model that includes interaction terms.
13
 
 
3.3 Data and variables 
Our analysis relies on bottle prices and labelling attributes of French still wines 
from a survey that was undertaken in August 1994 in 94 retail outlets of different 
commercial forms in England and Scotland (see Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2: Number and Type of Retailer  
 
Supermarket 
(27)  
Wine specialist 
(37) 
Hypermarket 
(18) 
Large retailer  
(5) 
Other 
(7) 
7 Tesco 4 Wine Rack 6 Asda 2 Littlewoods 1 Co-op 
3 Co-op  14 Victoria Wines 1 Morrisons 3 Marks & Spencer 1 Cullen's 
1 Somerfield 3 Unwin's 1 Safeway  1 Europa Food 
1 Kwiksave 8 Thresher 6 Sainsbury  1 Gateway 
6 Safeway 2 Oddbins 1 Scotmid  1 Independent 
6 Sainsbury 2 Majestic 3 Tesco  1 Kwiksave 
3 Waitrose 2 Cellar Five   1 Spar 
 1 Bottom's up    
 1 Haddows    
 
 
All French wines sold in those outlets were sampled, according to their market 
share in those regions. Since the data set reveals the number of outlets in which a 
particular bottle was found, we employ this information as a quantity proxy. In 
total, the data set comprises the prices of 7062 bottles. Since each bottle of wine 
appears on average in 3.2 outlets of each retailer, there are 2200 uniquely identified 
bottles. 
 
                                                          
13  The interaction terms of primary interest are those for region/variety.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
VARIABLE  
DESCRIPTION 
NO. OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
MEAN PRICE    
£ 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
VARIANCE 
TOTAL 2200* 6.47 5.69 32.14 
Red 1167 6.8788 6.77664 45.79 
White 975 6.1506 4.11092 16.885 
Rose 58 3.6994 1.92853 1.65 
Vin de table 303 3.6331 1.30032 1.6985 
AOC 1780 7.1731 6.07686 36.828 
Vin de pays 117 3.1605 0.56599 0.3149 
Asda 47 3.2679 0.88623 0.7777 
Littlewoods 14 3.1714 0.66441 0.4444 
M & S 44 5.2039 3.01071 9.0426 
Safeway 45 3.6707 1.08776 1.16 
Sainsbury 82 5.0207 3.02218 9.1312 
Tesco 109 4.1749 2.71108 7.3485 
Oddbins 3 3.3233 0.29868 0.08 
Cab Sauv 34 3.6044 0.76756 0.5789 
Chardonnay 58 4.5462 1.04426 1.0869 
Merlot 17 3.3935 0.65514 0.4321 
Muscat 12 5.3792 3.19987 10.23 
Pinot Blanc 15 5.2087 1.73316 2.9985 
Pinot noir 24 6.7825 2.84363 8.0448 
Semillon 192 3.3458 1.36644 1.8617 
Sauv. Blanc 48 3.7854 0.68716 0.4718 
Syrah 19 3.5416 0.51048 0.2659 
Gamay 5 3.43.43 0.59566 0.3043 
Vintage-83 6 18.843 15.0001 225.04 
Vintage-84 8 16.066 6.18174 38.118 
Vintage-87 28 13.526 6.49489 42.107 
Vintage-88 61 13.391 6.99933 48.906 
Vintage-89 131 10.096 5.73731 32.844 
Vintage-92 541 5.7962 2.96625 8.7767 
Alsace 89 7.6988 3.62154 13.07 
Bordeaux 222 4.3851 1.29924 1.6704 
Languedoc 431 3.7513 1.24369 1.5353 
Sauternes 16 13.371 3.05696 9.35 
South west 164 3.8151 1.13322 1.2882 
Cote de Beaune 74 15.328 6.34374 40.163 
Chablis 62 8.4989 2.69897 7.2346 
Cote de Nuits 56 17.313 8.28869 68.673 
 
*The descriptive statistics apply to the 2200 uniquely identified bottles in the sample. The difference between 
the total sum of all observed prices after accounting for replicates [7062] and the sum of observations for the 
above attributes as they remained in the final specification, is due to statistically in-significant attributes and 
the nature of the data set: some wines are specified by less attributes than others, (a) indication of the retailer‟s 
name from which the price was collected is only given if the retailer‟s name appears on the label of the bottle, 
or (b) it is due to legal restrictions (i.e. EU or national law does not allow to indicate the region of origin or the 
vintage for certain wines). 
Each price for a bottle of wine is, where appropriate, described by colour, grape 
variety, region of origin, category (e.g. AOC), importer, volume, producer, place of 
bottling and vintage. Thus all information that appears on the label of the bottles 
was recorded, except for the degree of alcohol. Summary statistics of the variables 
used in the following analysis are presented in Table 3. It is striking that the mean 
price of Appellations Contrôlées is more than twice as high as that for vin de pays, 
and that there is a much larger variance in Appellations Contrôlées prices (36.82) 
compared to that for the vin de pays prices (0.31). 
 
3.4 The functional form 
Since all our explanatory variables are dummy variables, the choice of the 
functional form is limited to the linear and the log-lin specifications. Nevertheless, 
the use of interaction terms allows us to gain additional flexibility.
14
 When we 
employ a log-lin hedonic price function, we assume non-constant marginal Engel 
prices (the prices paid for incremental units of characteristics when purchased as 
part of the same bundle) and constancy of relative prices with respect to changes in 
proportions of characteristics (Triplett, 1975). This log-lin specification therefore 
assumes homotheticity of the utility function, hence homogeneity of degree zero of 
the demand equations for attributes. Since only relative prices matter, the imputed 
price is independent of the level of the characteristic, which appears to be a realistic 
and convenient assumption, since only dummy variables are used as explanatory 
variables in the present model. Also, since the log-lin form allows each marginal 
implicit price to be a non-linear function of the entire set of characteristics, it 
appears as an attractive alternative hypothesis, since it accommodates the idea that 
bundling constraints are present for wine attributes in a bottle of wine. 
 
3.5 Data analysis and specification search 
The modelling strategy follows Hendry (2000) and Leamer‟s (1990) approach to 
data analysis in terms of estimation and sensitivity analysis. Although the Hendry 
methodology is time series based, the „general-to-specific‟ approach and the related 
steps are thought to be appropriate in the present cross-sectional context (Hendry, 
2000).
15
 Further, we apply the diagnostic framework suggested by Belsley et al. 
(1980), and Belsley (1986), to uncover statistical problems in an OLS framework.  
 
Estimation 
Model selection 
Theory does not provide further guidance on the inclusion of variables in the 
present application (it is assumed that all pre-selected variables have a resource 
cost/user value interpretation). Therefore we aim to pursue a rigorous estimation 
and testing procedure. Mindful of the degrees of freedom, we do not include the 
individual AOC names, but rather account for the presence or absence in a 
particular category (AOC, Vins de pays, etc.). Hence in the initial regression, we 
include region of origin, category, brand, importer, grape variety, colour and 
                                                          
14  Although we would expect that limited functional flexibility may limit the validity of the estimates, 
early studies suggest that such constraints may not be as limiting as expected (Butler (1982), Bartik 
and Smith (1987)). 
15  See Hansen (1996) for a discussion of Hendry's specification searches and his „general-to-specific‟ 
approach. 
vintage, jointly with a subset of interaction terms: colour/region of origin, 
category/region of origin, grape variety/region of origin, and grape variety/category. 
In contrast to previous hedonic studies, the subsequent selection procedure does not 
follow a purely mechanical procedure, such as stepwise regression, since the 
dangers of doing so are well established (e.g. Wallace and Ashar, 1972; Judge and 
Bock, 1983; Leamer, 1983; Greene, 2000). 
 
In our specification testing we follow Berndt and Griliches (1993) and compensate 
for the large sample size by choosing very small significance levels (i.e. 1%) for the 
standard F-tests. Further, we use the standard errors of the residuals (SER) between 
the unconstrained and constrained regressions, to aid inference (inter alia Ohta and 
Griliches (1975, 1986). If the difference in the SER of the regressions is smaller 
than or equal to 0.01 in the system under the test, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
For the semilogarithmic regression, an increase in SER by 0.01 implies an increase 
in the standard deviation of the unexplained component of price of about 1%.
16
 In 
searching for the most parsimonious specification, we follow Berndt and Griliches 
(1993) in rejecting the null-hypothesis when the root mean squared errors under the 
alternative results in a reduction of more than 5% in the standard deviation of the 
unexplained variation of log prices. In addition, the following specification tests 
were applied: 
 
(a) Tests for Heteroscedasticity 
We apply the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) and its extension by 
Koenker (1981) to correct for heteroscedasticity.
17
 Using weighted regressions also 
satisfies hedonic theory, as each attribute should be accounted for in terms of its 
market significance. 
 
(b) Specification tests for collinearity 
Since multicollinearity deserves special attention in hedonic models (Atkinkson and 
Crocker, 1987), we proceed in three steps: 
 
(i) We consider F-values, t values and corrected R-square together, but 
also rely on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) in order to attempt 
a judgment about the trade-off between model complexity and 
goodness of fit.
18
 
 
                                                          
16 Consider a difference in the standard errors in the constrained and unconstrained regressions of 0.01 
and a SER of the constrained regressions of 0.1. The implication is that the lack of fit of the 
constrained regression is increased by 10% compared with that of the unconstrained regression 
(0.01/0.1=0.1). Equally, if the SER was 0.2, the 0.01 criterion implies the willingness to accept up to 
a 5% deterioration in the fit of the model as measured by the standard error of its residuals. 
17  Since the present analysis employs GLS, only one form of heteroscedasticity is tested for. Given the 
weights in the present study, is assumed that the error variance varies with the expected price. The 
consequence is that White's (White, 1980) heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation 
cannot be employed. 
18  We prefer the AIC to the Schwarz criterion in the present context of a large number of potential 
variables, as the latter penalises model complexity much more heavily. 
(ii) Auxiliary regressions are estimated since collinearity can appear both 
in the form of linear dependence between variables, and as a lack of 
variation in the values of a control variable about its mean. 
 
(iii) We follow Belsley et al. (1980) and Judge et al. (1985) in 
examining the condition number of the data matrix. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
A „classical approach‟ to robust estimation is pursued as in Leamer (1990). In 
addition, we apply techniques for discovering influential observations, as developed 
by Belsley et al. (1980). These techniques are complemented by applying the 
trimmed least squares estimation method as performed by SHAZAM.
19
 Following 
Belsley et al. (1980), three diagnostics are examined: single-row diagnostics, an 
examination of the hat matrix, and the Lagrange-Multiplier test for normality 
(Jarque-Bera).
20
  For detecting those observations that are most strongly influential 
in relation to the others, we follow Belsley et al. (1980) and apply external scaling 
with corresponding size-adjusted cut-off values. If observations have a high 
leverage and a significant influence on the estimated parameters, we consider them 
as presenting potentially serious problems. We find that 2.1% of the observations 
fall into this category. However, after running trimmed least squares estimation, the 
parameter estimates were judged to be sufficiently robust to continue with weighted 
least squares regression. 
 
3.6 Estimation results 
The hedonic price functions are estimated by employing a General Least Squares 
(GLS) estimator. The resulting GLS regressions were performed for two reasons. 
First, employing GLS rather than OLS as an estimation rule is pursued on the basis 
that each attribute (and its price) in the context of hedonic market studies is 
important only to the extent that it captures some relevant fraction of the market 
(Griliches, 1961). Here, the weights applied in the GLS regressions reflect in how 
many retail outlets of each retailer type (e.g. Marks and Spencer) a uniquely 
identified bottle was found. It is therefore implicitly assumed that the sample 
fractions are directly proportionate to the number of bottles sold. Second, the 
implementation of GLS allows us to account for heteroscedasticity due to omitted 
variables and/or due to misspecification. 
 
The results suggest that retailer traits affect consumer choice in significant ways. 
Although it was not possible to compare exact attribute bundles across retailers, 
distinct and significant valuation of retailers were identified. However, lacking 
further heterogeneity in the data, we were only able to obtain an aggregate valuation 
of retailer traits which may well include the valuation of product diversity, 
reputation, as well as service and locational cost advantages of a given retailer.
21
 In 
                                                          
19  All regressions were performed by using SHAZAM, version 7.0. 
20  This hat matrix (equation 2.15 in Besley et al., 1980) determines the fitted values. Since the 
diagonal elements of the hat matrix have a distance interpretation, they provide a basic starting point 
for revealing 'multivariate outliers' which would not be revealed by scatter plots when p > 2. 
21  Betancourt and Malanoski (1995) provide empirical evidence of the mechanisms through which 
retail distribution services (cleanliness, short wait for checkout, unit pricing on shelves, convenient 
store location) affect demand, costs and retail competition. The authors demonstrate that for their 
all cases where conditional effects between attributes were found to have a 
significant impact on price, consumers are viewed as regarding these attribute 
bundles as imperfect substitutes. In these instances, outstanding grape varieties are 
shown to have a strongly positive or negative regional impact on price, just as 
outstanding regions have a similar grape varietal impact. 
As in many previous applications of hedonic price analysis, the linear specification 
was rejected in favour of the log-lin model and the estimation results of the log-lin 
model are presented in Table 4. Recall that the coefficient estimates measure the 
relative impact on the dependent variable (the unit price evaluated at the sample 
means) of the presence of the attribute ceteris paribus. The estimates are therefore 
interpreted as follows. The relative impact of red and white wines on price (1.97% 
and 0.99%, respectively) suggests that market participants attribute a higher 
valuation to red wines, although the impact is close to average. This is expected 
insofar as France is better known in Britain for its classic reds (clarets) than for its 
white wines. The fact that rosé wines are relatively less appreciated seems to be 
reflected in the negative impact on price (20.26%). 
 
As for the wine categories, consumers appear to value regional appellations (AOC 
wines) positively (6.9%), whereas the Vins de Pays (VdP), which contain most 
varietal wines, and the Vins de Table (VdT) show a negative impact on price 
(33.3% and 21.06% respectively). The more negative valuation of the VdP 
compared to the VdT appears initially surprising, because the VdP were originally 
conceived as a superior sub-category of the VdT.  
 
However, if we reconsider the production figures of the largest region where 
varietal wines originate from (Figure 3), our results support the observation that 
French varietal wines were still in their early stages of being highly appreciated by 
British consumers. Assuming that most varietal wines are consumed when still 
young (before they are two years old), we may compare our estimates for 1994 with 
the production data for 1992. Considering Figure 3, we observe that varietal wines 
grew steadily until 1996, where they reached a production of about 3 Million hl. In 
1992, however, the production had reached around 1 Million hl. Therefore, the 
conclusions that we can draw from the production data is in line with our estimates, 
which suggest that French varietal wines, as they appeared in retail outlets during 
1994, had not achieved a sufficiently positive valuation by British market 
participants in order to reverse the overall diminishing role of French wines in 
Britain. 
 
As for the valuation of off-license outlet traits, the high impact of Oddbins and 
Marks and Spencer on price is positive as anticipated (+71.3% and +46.6%, 
respectively), possibly reflecting the value consumers place on the knowledgeable 
service in the case of the former, and the consistently good quality of the latter. In 
contrast, Asda achieves a lower impact on price (-13.3%) reflecting its position in 
the market as a large discount-conscious supermarket chain.
                                                                                                                                                     
sample of 616 supermarkets across the United States, distribution services have a positive effect on 
the demand for product. 
Table 4: Estimation Results of the Log-Lin Hedonic Model 
 
VARIABLE  ESTIMATED 
COEFFICIENT 
RELATIVE 
IMPACT%  
STANDARD 
ERROR 
T-RATIO 
(7025 DF) 
RED 1.95E-02 1.97 4.87E-03 4.00 
*WHITE -9.88E-03 -0.99 5.85E-03 -1.69 
ROSE -0.22608 -20.26 2.60E-02 -8.71 
VIN DE TABLE -0.23634 -21.06 1.41E-02 -16.71 
A.O.C. 6.69E-02 6.92 3.09E-03 21.63 
*VIN DE PAYS -0.40553 -33.35 1.98E-02 -20.51 
ASDA -0.14243 -13.30 2.13E-02 -6.69 
LITTLEWOODS 0.11537 12.00 6.45E-02 1.79 
M & S 0.38308 46.61 3.06E-02 12.50 
*SAFEWAY -0.10476 -9.97 2.40E-02 -4.36 
SAINSBURY -3.71E-02 -3.65 1.45E-02 -2.56 
TESCO -5.10E-02 -4.98 1.31E-02 -3.89 
ODDBINS 0.54887 71.29 0.1463 3.75 
CAB SAUVIGNON -0.35025 -29.88 9.77E-02 -3.59 
CHARDONNAY 1.84E-02 1.78 3.77E-02 0.49 
MERLOT 0.10625 11.08 4.80E-02 2.21 
MUSCAT 0.35031 41.49 8.06E-02 4.35 
*PINOT BLANC -0.37107 -31.12 5.94E-02 -6.25 
PINOT NOIR 0.11722 12.35 3.92E-02 2.99 
SEMILLON 7.00E-02 7.24 1.58E-02 4.44 
SAUVIGNON BLANC -8.28E-02 -7.98 2.70E-02 -3.07 
SYRAH 0.16399 17.69 4.71E-02 3.48 
GAMAY -0.27659 -24.50 9.44E-02 -2.93 
VINTAGE-83 0.48509 61.24 0.1215 3.99 
VINTAGE-84 0.25442 28.47 8.84E-02 2.88 
VINTAGE-87 0.43912 55.01 4.01E-02 10.94 
*VINTAGE-88 0.47508 60.75 2.85E-02 16.66 
VINTAGE-89 0.22599 25.34 1.81E-02 12.52 
VINTAGE-92 -0.14016 -13.08 5.50E-03 -25.47 
ALSACE 0.29492 34.25 2.68E-02 11.00 
BORDEAUX -0.18206 -16.65 1.26E-02 -14.41 
LANGUEDOC -0.23204 -20.71 1.00E-02 -23.17 
SAUTERNES 0.83904 130.93 6.46E-02 12.98 
*SOUTH WEST -0.23212 -20.72 1.49E-02 -15.58 
COTE DE BEAUNE 0.9656 162.52 3.01E-02 32.07 
CHABLIS 0.39811 48.85 2.73E-02 14.56 
COTE DE NUITS 0.90325 146.64 3.10E-02 29.16 
**CHARDONNAY- 
LANGUEDOC 
0.31296 36.56 5.25E-02 5.96 
**MUSCAT-ALSACE -0.30713 -27.19 0.1425 -2.16 
**SAUVIGNON BLANC-
BORDEAUX 
-0.13177 -12.41 3.91E-02 -3.37 
**CABERNET SAUV- 
LANGUEDOC 
0.53514 69.70 0.1122 4.77 
**SEMILLON-LANGUEDOC -1.61E-02 -1.61 9.74E-03 -1.66 
CONSTANT 1.64  4.80E-03 341.40 
2R  : 0.51. Breusch-Pagan Test: 2  = 45.6 with 36 D.F. [for 36 D.F., P ( 2  > 50.9985 = 0.05] 
* Variables are taken from symmetric regressions.** Variables are interaction terms. „E-02‟ and „E-03‟ denotes 
210 and 310 , respectively. The impact of the attribute on price is measured as in equation (1). 
Marks and Spencer, in contrast, whose reputation is built on quality, dependability 
and good value, is a traditional retailer that is tailored towards consumer groups 
with higher income. Closest to average impact is Sainsbury (-3.6%), followed by 
Tesco (-4.9%) and Safeway (-9.9%). Tesco's additional „trait‟ of arguably offering 
the widest range of wines amongst all retailers does not, therefore, appear to be 
sufficient to make Tesco more highly regarded than Sainsbury.
22
 As emphasised in 
section 3.6, product diversity, reputation as well as service and locational cost 
advantages of a given retailer may all contribute to these impacts on price. But since 
we have no further heterogeneity in the data set that we could exploit, we cannot 
disentangle these effects further. 
 
The following paragraphs focus on the estimation results with regards to the 
valuation of grape varieties, regional origins and vintage. To begin with, the 
valuation of the different vintages should be regarded with caution. If unmeasured 
quality attributes make certain vintages survive in the market, the vintage 
coefficients could reflect these unmeasured quality differences among the surviving 
wines.
23
 No consistent pattern emerges, although we would expect that an 
increasing valuation of older vintages would reflect both interest rate differentials as 
well as cost of storage. However, both 1987 as well as 1988 show a higher 
contribution than expected (+55% and +60.7%, respectively). Interestingly, the 
1988 vintage is reputed to be particularly good for wines from Sauternes, Rhône 
and for red wines from Burgundy.
24
 
 
A more detailed look at the estimates for regional origins supports our previous 
assertion that the positive valuation of French varietal wines by market participants 
was not sufficient to reverse the overall competitive decline of French wines in the 
British wine market. Although Alsace is not a very important contributor to the 
overall sample, the fact that Riesling, Muscat, Pinot Blanc and Pinot Noir are 
classic grapes that appear on the label of wines from Alsace, puts their overall price 
impacts in a different light (no significant impact of Riesling; +41.5%, -31.2% and 
+12.3% for the others respectively). The negative overall impact of Muscat from 
Alsace (-27.2%) is especially surprising and suggests that consumers‟ valuation for 
Muscat from other regions has a far greater influence on Muscat's overall impact on 
price (+41.5%) than the impact of Muscat from Alsace.  
 
The very high valuation of wines from Sauternes (+130.9%) is not surprising, given 
its special regional recognition in the wine world and its costly production methods. 
Although Semillon achieves a positive overall impact on price (+7.2%), an expected 
significant regional valuation for Semillon from Sauternes does not emerge. 
Similarly, a high valuation for Chablis (+48.85%), a producer of Chardonnay, and 
the Côte de Nuits (+146.6%), whose Pinot Noir is generally well known, is 
anticipated. 
                                                          
22  However, the present methodology is clearly not aimed nor suited to provide an explicit valuation 
that consumers place on product diversity per se. See Kadiyali et al. (1999) and Perloff and Ward 
(2000) for an empirical investigation into the competitive effects of product line extensions, and the 
valuation of product diversity in a random-parameter discrete choice model, respectively. 
23  See Berndt and Griliches (1993) for a discussion of age coefficients among microcomputers. 
24 For details, consult the vintage chart of The International Wine and Food Society, Robinson (1994), 
p.1046. 
At first sight, the impact of Merlot, Gamay and Syrah on price (+11%, -24.5% and 
+17.7%) lies within expectations. While Syrah is the noble grape of many Rhône 
wines (it also goes into red AOC Chateauneuf-du-Pape wines), our finding of a 
positive impact on price is also supported by its high appreciation when Languedoc-
Roussillon is its regional origin (Robinson, 1994, p.942).  Gamay, which is the 
basis for Beaujolais, is generally not known for superior quality.
25
 The estimate for 
Merlot is more difficult to explain. Merlot is an increasingly important grape variety 
that appears explicitly on the label of many wines from the South West and 
Languedoc-Roussillon. In Languedoc-Roussillon itself, the area of Merlot plantings 
has increased by 166% between 1979 and 2000 (Harpers, 2003). But Bordeaux 
wines, which are dominated by AOC wines for which the label does not disclose the 
grape variety, is responsible for two thirds of the 40,000 ha merlot plantings in 
France. In sum, despite insignificance of corresponding region-variety interaction 
terms, the positive impact of Syrah and Merlot is likely to be explained by its 
valuation when originating from Languedoc-Roussillon. 
 
It is interesting to note that out of five significant interaction terms, three are related 
to Languedoc-Roussillon. The relatively high regard of wines from Languedoc-
Roussillon, in terms of its regional, rather than overall, impact on price, is 
especially evident in the case of Cabernet Sauvignon (+69.7%) and Chardonnay 
(+36.6%). If we consider this high regional valuation of Chardonnay together with 
the significant but only slightly positive overall price impact of Chardonnay, and 
the much higher positive overall price impact of geographical origins like Chablis, 
Sauternes or Côte de Nuits, our results point to the still rather modest recognition of 
French varietal wines in the UK in 1994. 
 
The negative impact of Bordeaux origin on price is not too surprising (-16.6%), 
both on the overall as well as on the regional level, as in the case of the interaction 
with Sauvignon Blanc (-12.4%). Compared to other AOCs, the Bordeaux AOCs 
comprise a rather large category. Robinson (1994) suggests that the ubiquitous and 
undistinguished Bordeaux AOCs emerge with a quality variation that is “simply 
frustrating” (p.42).  
 
In sum, two findings are particularly striking. First, the low market valuation for 
Bordeaux wines, which represent not only the second largest regional origin in the 
off-licence sales under investigation, but also a reputational cornerstone of French 
wines. Second, the modest valuation by market participants of a relatively small 
market segment, the varietal wines. Given these findings, it is not surprising that 
French wines underwent a competitive decline in Britain since the early 1990s. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Since the early 1990s French wines have lost market share in the British wine 
market. This occurred after decades of successful marketing of French wines in 
Britain, differentiated by geographic appellation. This article explores to what 
extent the relative valuation of varietal wines and geographic appellations can serve 
to explain the French decline in the British off-licence sector. We examine the 
                                                          
25  “... generic blended Beaujolais can simply be a thin, inky liquid that is in all senses lacklustre.” 
(Robinson, 1994, p.105). 
values which consumers place on the information provided by French wine labels in 
the British wine market. By means of a parametric hedonic approach, implicit 
prices for these labelling attributes are derived from prices and quantity proxies of 
wines sold in the British off-licence market in 1994. 
 
Considering consumers‟ region-specific valuation of grape varieties together with 
their overall recognition of varieties beyond specific regions, our results point to a 
rather modest recognition of French varietal wines in the UK in 1994. In contrast to 
Languedoc, which is known for its dynamic approach to labelling and technology 
adoption, varietal wines from a region that underwent a more traditional approach 
to varietal labelling, notably Muscat from Alsace, do not achieve a positive impact 
on price. Further, our estimates indicate that the two categories which contain most 
of the French varietal wines, the country and table wine category, achieve a 
distinctly negative valuation. Considering these results together with the negative 
valuation of Sauvignon Blanc from Bordeaux, the overall low valuation of varietal 
wines could be regarded as an important factor in explaining the continuing decline 
of France‟s role in the British wine market after 1994. The negative valuation for 
Bordeaux is particularly surprising, considering the leading role that these wines 
have traditionally taken in promoting French wines. However, it may be explained 
by the possible overload and confusing array of geographical indications under 
which a large and undistinguished range of Bordeaux AOCs is sold. 
 
Accounting also for the more vigorous expansion path of sales of varietal wines 
from other origins („New World wines‟), there appears to be further evidence that 
the highly detailed labelling approach to French wines based on traditional category 
classifications schemes (the country and table wine category) were, by 1994, unable 
to reverse the competitive decline of French wines in Britain. The only modestly 
positive valuation of the Appellations Contrôlées by market participants adds 
further to explain the overall decline of the role of French wines since 1992. In sum, 
both the lack of a consistently positive valuation of varietal wines and the low 
valuation of long-established wines with geographical appellation in our sample 
point to a weakness of the French labelling approach in the early 1990s. 
 
Given this lack of success of French wines in the British off-licence sector, we 
conjecture that a reconsideration of the labelling approach might have improved the 
position of French wines in the British wine market. Specifically, our results 
suggest that a more transparent, flexible and simplified approach to labelling would 
have been beneficial to the sales of French wines. Apart from serving legislative 
demands, the question still remains whether the established labelling regulations 
have truly served to promote informed consumer choices between distinct attribute 
bundles, and sent the appropriate market signals to producers. 
 
Future research could proceed along several lines. Firstly, the analyst may be 
interested in eliciting the „true preferences‟ of the consumers in the context of 
attribute demand and welfare analysis. An evaluation of a change in labelling policy 
could benefit from linking revealed and stated preference approaches (Herriges et 
al., 1999). Secondly, a more refined decomposition of the contributions to the 
implicit price estimates could follow from exploiting existing heterogeneity in the 
data. Although we find significant and expected valuations for the dummy variables 
of the retailers, product diversity, reputation as well as service and locational cost 
advantages of a given retailer may all contribute to the implicit price estimates. 
Further, since the aggregate market valuation of retailers in our sample is likely to 
include a valuation for product diversity, the analyst may be interested in a distinct 
valuation of product diversity per se, as it is provided by different retailers. With 
greater heterogeneity in the data, such issues could be further disentangled (Nevo, 
2001; Kim et al., 2002). 
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